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The Public Control of Corporate
Power: Revisiting the 1909 U.S.
Corporate Tax from a
Comparative Perspective
Ajay K. Mehrotra*
The origins of U.S. corporate taxation are often associated with
the 1909 corporate excise tax. Scholars who have investigated the
beginnings of this levy have mainly focused on the legislative history
of the 1909 corporate tax to argue that it was either an expression of
the Progressive Era impulse to regulate large-scale corporations or
an attempt to use corporations as remittance devices to collect taxes
aimed at wealthy shareholders. This Article broadens the conventional
historical accounts of the emergence of American corporate taxation by
revisiting the 1909 U.S. corporate tax from a comparative perspective.
The aim is to look both below and beyond the American nation-state
to determine how and why U.S. state governments and other Western
industrialized nations tried to tax corporations at the turn of the
twentieth century. This Article investigates a small slice of subnational
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and transnational comparative examples: corporate tax laws and
policies in a few representative nineteenth-century industrializing
American states, and in turn-of-the-century England and Germany.
Building on the well- known insights of comparative business history,
this Article contends that historically- determined political interests,
social ideas, and cultural beliefs help explain the American obsession
with disciplining large-scale business corporations through the use
of nominally punitive tax laws and policies. Comparative-historical
analysis shows how differences in the organizational structures of
big businesses across place and time have led to variations in
political economy that were ultimately expressed in the legal ideas
and cultural attitudes toward corporate capitalism. These variations,
in turn, shaped the transnational distinctions in corporate tax law and
policies. Greater attention to the comparative-historical development
of law and political economy may help us understand the stubborn
persistence of American corporate taxation, particularly in the face
of recent global changes and the relentless economic critiques of the
double taxation of corporate income.

INTRODUCTION

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the large-scale business
corporation came to dominate American law and political economy. Led
by the likes of Standard Oil and U.S. Steel, colossal industrial corporations
wielded a great deal of power and authority in American public life.1 These
large-scale, bureaucratized corporations employed hundreds of thousands of
individuals, and controlled a great deal of American private property. Indeed,
by the end of the 1920s, the small, local, proprietary family-firm appeared to be
a relic of bygone days. In its place emerged the signature marker of American
industrial capitalism: the modern business corporation, complete with distinct
organizational units managed by a hierarchy of salaried executives.2

1

2

GLENN PORTER, THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS, 1860-1910 (1973); MORTON KELLER,
REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY: PUBLIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN
AMERICA, 1900-1933 (1990); OLIVER ZUNZ, MAKING AMERICA CORPORATE, 18701920 (1990); ALAN TRACTENBURG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE
AND SOCIETY IN THE GILDED AGE (1982).
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); LOUIS GALAMBOS, THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF BIG
BUSINESS IN AMERICA, 1880-1940 (1975); MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE
RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN CAPITALISM, 1890-1916 (1988); DAVID BUNTING,
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Contemporaries reacted to the growth of big business with tremendous
ambivalence. Some celebrated the enormous industrial corporation as the
ideal of economic efficiency, as the essential vehicle for mobilizing capital
and implementing the lessons of scientific management. Consequently, the
leaders of these corporate enterprises were often lionized by admirers as
visionary, industrial statesmen.3 Others were more suspicious of these new
corporate behemoths and the men who led them. Tapping the deep-seated
American antimonopoly tradition, critics characterized large corporations as
rapacious financial predators that disregarded the rule of law and common
morality in their relentless efforts to expand and entrench their economic
empires. Critics feared that the concentration of economic and political power
amassed in these large business corporations would threaten republican values
and the core ideals of a liberal democracy. Detractors thus denigrated the men
who led these businesses as a "gang of thieves," or as unscrupulous and ruthless
"robber barons."4
The social tensions that accompanied the rise of American corporate
capitalism were reflected in the contemporary debates over the appropriate
tax treatment of business corporations. Economic experts, lawmakers, and
concerned citizens contemplated how or even whether corporations should
be taxed. In many ways, this was not a new concern. To be sure, large
business corporations had been in existence in the United States since
the birth of the republic — mainly in connection with transportation. As
the creatures of special state charters, these early corporations were not
only imbued with a public purpose, they were also liable to a variety of
subnational levies, particularly the general property tax that dominated state
and local government revenues.5
The federal taxation of corporations, however, took on greater salience

3

4

5

THE RISE OF LARGE AMERICAN CORPORATIONS, 1889-1919 (1987). On the
importance of Chandler’s work to the development of modern business history
see Richard R. John, Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents: Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.’s,
The Visible Hand After Twenty Years, 71 BUS. HIST. REV. 151 (1997).
See, e.g., ALLAN NEVINS, STUDY IN POWER: JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, INDUSTRIALIST
AND PHILANTHROPIST (1953); MAURY KLEIN, THE CHANGE MAKERS: FROM
CARNEGIE TO GATES, HOW THE GREAT ENTREPRENEURS TRANSFORMED IDEAS INTO
INDUSTRIES 2-3 (2004).
CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, JR. & HENRY ADAMS, CHAPTERS OF ERIE AND OTHER
ESSAYS 30 (Boston, Osgood & Co. 1871), quoted in THOMAS K. MCCRAW, PROPHETS
OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS,
ALFRED E. KAHN 16 (1984); MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS: THE
GREAT AMERICAN CAPITALISTS, 1861-1901 (1934).
JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
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at the turn of the twentieth century for two principal reasons. First, this
was the time of the great merger movement which led to the consolidation
of many of the nation’s largest industrial corporations — a consolidation
that fueled both the hopes and anxieties related to the rise of American
corporate capitalism.6 Second, the turn of the century was also the high-water
mark for U.S. tax reform. It was then that progressive activists were seeking to
supplant the existing national system of indirect and regressive import duties
and excise taxes with a more equitable regime of direct and graduated taxes.7
In their efforts to transform the American system of public finance, reformers
intimately linked the public control of corporate power to the construction of
a fair and effective system of taxation. As one concerned citizen, writing to
tax authorities in 1910, concisely explained, "The two great administrative
problems before our people at this time are, first, the control of corporate
wealth, and, second, the establishment of a rational system of taxation."8
The twin aims of regulating corporations and reforming the existing tax
structure are generally part of the conventional explanations for why the
U.S. federal government adopted a corporate excise tax in 1909. Scholars
who have investigated the beginnings of U.S. corporate taxation have sought
to uncover the original intent of the 1909 tax by exploring the high-level
political debates of American national lawmakers. Accordingly, the standard
historical narrative has developed along two paths. One story focuses on how
populist and progressive anxieties about the growth of corporate power and
prevailing juridical conceptions of corporate personality led congressional
leaders and President William Howard Taft to use the tax as a regulatory
tool to publicize and control the wealth and power of corporate managers
and owners.9 An alternative account suggests that because most legal theorists

6

7

8

9

LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970 (1970); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE
AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991).
NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, THE GREAT MERGER MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN BUSINESS,
1895-1904 (1988); RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN
INDUSTRY, 1895-1956 (1959).
SIDNEY RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN
DEMOCRACY (1942); W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A
SHORT HISTORY (1996); STEVEN R. WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS: LINCOLN
TO WILSON — THE FIERCE BATTLES OVER MONEY AND POWER THAT TRANSFORMED
THE NATION (2002).
Letter from H.S. Wilson to Nils P. Haugen, Wis. Tax Comm’r (Sept. 1, 1910) (Box
56, Nils P. Haugen Papers, The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison,
Wisconsin).
JOHN D. BUENKER, THE INCOME TAX AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (1985); RATNER,
supra note 7; Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Corporate Regulation and the Origins of the
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at the time viewed the corporation as simply an aggregation of individuals,
and not as a separate legal entity, lawmakers used the corporation primarily
to raise revenue; corporations, according to this view, were merely collection
agents or withholding devices used to remit taxes aimed primarily at individual
shareholders.10 The existing legal and political historiography, thus, frames
the scholarly debate over the beginnings of U.S. corporate taxation around the
competing claims of regulation versus remittance.
American national lawmakers were not, however, the only policymakers
struggling with the question regarding how and why corporations ought
to be taxed, or with the more fundamental concern about the role of
corporations in a capitalist democracy. Government officials in earlier
periods and in other nation-states confronted similar issues. The application
of subnational American property taxes to corporations, for example, had
long been a perennial and vexing issue throughout the nineteenth century.
And as state governments experimented in the late nineteenth century
with new forms of taxation, as substitutes for the failing property tax, the
taxation of corporations remained a central concern. Likewise, the United
States was not the only developed country dealing with the existence of
large-scale business corporations. Other Western industrialized democracies
faced similar concerns about the growth of big business and the application
of tax laws and policies to these large organizations.11
This Article revisits the 1909 U.S. corporate tax from a comparative
perspective. The aim is to look both below and beyond the American
nation-state to determine how and why U.S. state governments and other
Western industrialized nations tried to tax corporations. For the sake of

Corporate Income Tax, 66 IND. L.J. 53 (1990); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations,
Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193
(2004) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society]; Avi-Yonah, Why Was the
U.S. Corporate Tax Enacted in 1909?, in 2 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW
377 (John Tiley ed., 2007).
10 Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173 (2001); Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory
of the Corporate Tax, 94 GEO>. L.J. 889 (2006); Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as
Myth in the U.S. Corporate Excise Tax of 1909, in 2 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF
TAX LAW, supra note 9, at 393 [hereinafter Bank, Entity Theory].
11 CHRISTOPHER J. SCHMITZ, THE GROWTH OF BIG BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND WESTERN EUROPE, 1850-1939 (1995); MANSEL G. BLACKFORD, THE RISE OF
MODERN BUSINESS IN GREAT BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND JAPAN (1998);
ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM (1990).
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brevity, this Article investigates only a small slice of subnational and
transnational comparative examples: corporate tax laws and policies in a
few representative nineteenth-century industrializing American states, and
in turn-of-the-century Britain and Germany.12
Yet even this brief comparative analysis places in bold relief the U.S.
preoccupation with taxing capital, and more specifically with taxing business
corporations. Not only did leading American state governments attempt to
apply their property taxes to corporations, but as states and commonwealths
reformed their fiscal structures, corporations consistently remained at the
center of their taxing efforts. Similarly, U.S. national lawmakers in the early
twentieth century also focused on corporations as they designed and adopted
new federal levies. By contrast, other Western industrialized nations, like
England, refrained from imposing levies directly on corporations, and certain
German states such as Prussia attempted to mitigate the potential double
taxation of corporate income.13
The national emergencies occasioned by the two world wars, of course,
forced nearly all combatant nations to reconsider their fiscal policies,
but the comparative divergence in corporate tax laws and policies has
remained remarkably resilient. Indeed, to this day the United States remains
comparatively unique. Whereas the United States has, for the most part,
maintained a "classical" system of taxing corporate income twice,14 most
industrialized nations including the United Kingdom and Germany have
adopted the U.S. style of corporate taxation only for limited time periods,
adhering instead to some degree of relief from the double taxation of corporate
income.15 This contrast yields an apparent historical paradox: the United
States, the alleged capitalist bastion of laissez-faire political economy, seems

12 For a succinct comparative history of the beginnings of income taxation in these

countries see generally Bernard Grossfeld & James D. Bryce, A Brief Comparative
History of the Origins of Income Taxation in Great Britain, Germany, and the
United States, 2 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 211 (1983). Since German tax policy at the time
varied by province, this Article focuses on Prussia, the largest and most industrial
of German states, as the leading representation of German corporate tax policy.
13 MARTIN DAUNTON, TRUSTING LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS OF TAXATION IN BRITAIN,
1799-1914, at 210-18 (2001); MARTIN DAUNTON, JUST TAXES: THE POLITICS OF
TAXATION IN BRITAIN, 1914-1979, at 89-94 (2002) [hereinafter DAUNTON, JUST
TAXES]; PETER A. HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXATION (1996).
14 In recent years, the U.S. has provided some relief from double taxation by taxing
shareholder returns on corporate profits (dividends and capital gains) at lower rates.
See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27,
117 Stat. 752.
15 HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A
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to have embraced a rather punitive approach to taxing business corporations
and their owners.16
What explains the apparent historical paradox of American corporate
tax exceptionalism? Why were U.S. lawmakers, during the formative
development of the income tax, preoccupied with taxing business
corporations? The vast and growing scholarship on comparative-historical
law and political economy suggests that the specific structure of American
economic and political institutions may provide part of the answer.17
One explanation suggests that comparative differences in dividend policy
attributable to the greater separation of ownership and control of large
American corporations may explain the divergence in corporate tax policy.18
Another implies that a historically-specific American political response to
concentrations of economic power may have fueled the path-dependent
origins of the U.S. income tax.19 Still other accounts focus on political
institutions to argue that the dispersed and fragmented nature of American
political power has affected tax policy,20 and that the lack of a centralized

16

17

18

19

20

STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS, 273- 77 (2004); VICTOR THURONYI, COMPARATIVE TAX
LAW 281-85 (2003); HARRIS, supra note 13.
Legal historians have identified similar paradoxes in contrasting nineteenth-century
Anglo-American trust law. See, e.g., Joshua Getzler, Transplantation and Mutation
in Anglo-American Trust Law, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 355 (2009).
For a sample of the broad literature on comparative-historical political economy see
generally ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POWER (1969); CREATING MODERN CAPITALISM: HOW
ENTREPRENEURS, COMPANIES, AND COUNTRIES TRIUMPHED IN THREE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTIONS (Thomas K. McCraw ed., 1997); VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE
INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE (Peter A. Hall & David
Soskice eds., 2001).
Steven A. Bank, The Dividend Divide in Anglo-American Corporate Taxation, 30
J. CORP. L. 2 (2004). Comparative differences in corporate governance may be
explained, as Colleen Dunlavy has recently contended, by institutional variations
in the intergovernmental division of policymaking power and in the diversity of
shareholder rights across place and time. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions
of the Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholding Voting Rights, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (2006); Colleen Dunlavy & Thomas Welskopp, Myths
and Peculiarities: Comparing U.S. and German Capitalism, 41 BULL. GERMAN
HIST. INST. 33 (2007).
Kimberly J. Morgan & Monica Prasad, The Origins of Tax Systems: A FrenchAmerican Comparison, 114 AM. J. SOC. 1350 (2009). For more on how historical
American political responses to concentrated economic power shaped the structure
of U.S. corporate governance see generally MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS,
WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994).
SVEN STEINMO, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY: SWEDISH, BRITISH, AND AMERICAN
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and hierarchical authority has cultivated a costly and debilitating American
system of "adversarial legalism."21
Prominent among the standard institutional explanations is the historical
interaction of politics and business. As a variety of scholars have
demonstrated, American statecraft has long been distinguished by its
antagonism towards big business. The early arrival of American managerial
capitalism in the mid and late 1800s preceded and in some ways compelled
the development of the modern regulatory and administrative state. As a
result, a unique American divide between private enterprise and public
administration began to develop.22 Although antitrust law is generally the
policy arena that scholars have explored to substantiate this claim,23 the
tensions between American government and big business can also be clearly
seen in the evolution of U.S. subnational corporate tax policy and transnational
comparisons of corporate tax laws and concepts.
A primary focus on political and economic institutions, however, only
explicates part of the story. Institutions do not just suddenly appear. They
are created and composed of individuals and groups with specific interests,
ideas, and cultural beliefs. And, perhaps more importantly, institutions
change and develop over time as they interact with other groups and
institutions, and respond to changing historical conditions. Thus, while
it is vitally important to examine how institutional frameworks mediate

APPROACHES TO FINANCING THE MODERN STATE (1993). In a variant of this view,
the American legal historian, Robert Stanley, has argued that the origins of the U.S.
income tax can be traced to a "centrist" political ideology that used the income tax
to placate more radical calls for redistribution. ROBERT STANLEY, DIMENSIONS OF
LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX, 1861-1913
(1993).
21 ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW
(2001); DAVID VOGEL, KINDRED STRANGERS: THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
BUSINESS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA (1996).
22 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Government Versus Business: An American Phenomenon,
in BUSINESS AND PUBLIC POLICY 1 (John Dunlop ed., 1980); see also the essays
contained in REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE: HISTORICAL ESSAYS (Thomas K. McCraw
ed., 1981). "Because two sets of administrative hierarchies grew at different periods
of time for different reasons to carry out different functions with different objectives,
two quite different cultures appeared," explained Chandler in his classic essay. "The
work, attitudes, and perspectives of the business manager and the civil servant
became and remained almost as distinct and separate as those of the humanist and
the scientist." See Chandler, supra, at 4.
23 See, e.g., Thomas K. McCraw, Rethinking the Trust Question, in REGULATION IN
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 22, at 4-5.
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political interests, social ideas, and cultural beliefs, these interests, ideas, and
beliefs in turn also shape institutional frameworks.24 Put differently, political,
social, and cultural factors are endogenous to institutional explanations of
the American approach to taxing business corporations. In the context of
the comparative history of corporate tax policy, this means that attending
to the historically-determined political interests, social ideas, and cultural
beliefs may help explain the American obsession with disciplining large-scale
business corporations through the use of punitive tax laws and policies.25
Before turning to the comparative analysis, this Article begins in Part I with
a brief summary of the 1909 corporate excise tax, succinctly recapitulating
the conventional accounts about the beginnings of American corporate
taxation. Part II turns to the subnational story to explain how and why
leading American states and commonwealths attempted to tax corporate
property under their respective general property taxes; how they searched for
alternative corporate taxes; and how even newly-created state income taxes
were applied to business corporations. This analysis shows that state-level
lawmakers purposefully used tax policy in a punitive manner not only to
make corporations more transparent, but also to check the growing power
and authority of corporate capital.
Part III is devoted to briefly exploring transnational comparisons between
the United States, England, and Germany. It focuses on how differences in
the organizational structures of big businesses in the three countries led to
variations in political economy that were ultimately expressed in the legal
ideas and cultural attitudes toward corporate capitalism. These variations,
in turn, shaped the differences in corporate tax laws and policies. Part III
begins by contrasting the U.S with Britain. In the latter country, a form
of family managerial capitalism and an intertwined public/private sector
pervaded British ideas and beliefs to the point that it was often assumed
that corporations were simply aggregations of individuals. Consequently,

24 James T. Kloppenburg, Institutionalism, Rational Choice and Historical Analysis,

28 POLITY 125 (1995).
25 If one conceptualizes jurisprudence and economic thought as subsets of national

cultures and traditions, the conventional narratives of American corporate taxation
can be seen as cultural histories of taxation. Scholarly debates over regulation versus
remittance often turn on the meanings of corporate personality, and such conceptions
of the corporation are perhaps embedded in differing cultures and traditions. For
more on the comparative-historical importance of political power, national culture,
and economic policymaking in the late nineteenth century see generally FRANK
DOBBIN, FORGING INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, AND FRANCE
IN THE RAILWAY AGE (1994).
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English lawmakers were loath to adopt the American system of corporate
taxation, which they did only briefly in the early 1920s and again in the late
twentieth century. Part III also investigates Germany, and more particularly
the Prussian experience with corporate taxation, to explicate how differing
commercial organizational capabilities, business-government relations, and
beliefs about corporations interacted with the pressures of fiscal federalism
to shape corporate tax policy. Finally, the Article concludes by considering
the possible long-term implications of the U.S.’s unique historical role in
corporate taxation.

I. REGULATION VERSUS REMITTANCE:
THE STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF THE
ORIGINS OF THE 1909 CORPORATE TAX
The Tariff Act of 1909 contained a national tax on the legal privilege of
doing business in corporate form. More specifically, the law required "every
corporation, joint stock company or association, organized for profit and
having a capital stock represented by shares" to pay a "special excise tax with
respect to the carrying on of doing business."26 The tax was set at an annual
flat rate of one percent on net income above $5,000, and even applied to all
foreign corporations engaged in business in the United States.27 The multiple
legislative rationales behind the 1909 tax have provided modern scholars with
sufficient evidence to ascribe different meanings to the origins of the American
regime of corporate taxation. Whereas some scholars have focused on the
regulatory aspects of the law, others have emphasized how the mechanics
of the measure suggest that the tax was aimed mainly at shareholder, not
corporate, wealth and power.28
The 1909 tax was not, however, the first national levy on business
corporations. From the Civil War to the Spanish-American War, national
lawmakers in the late nineteenth century experimented with several
temporary corporate taxes. Yet none of these early measures seemed
specifically designed to capture the taxpaying ability of corporations
qua corporations. The Civil War income tax, for example, applied to
business profits, but mainly as an indirect means to tax individual

26 Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 11, 112-13.
27 The law excluded "amounts received by [corporations] as dividends upon stock of

other corporations." Id.
28 See sources cited supra notes 9-10.
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shareholders.29 Similarly, the short-lived 1894 income tax, which was declared
unconstitutional the following year,30 imposed a two percent tax on the net
income of all corporations, but because dividends from taxable corporations
were excluded from shareholder income and because the levy was also
imposed on undistributed corporate income, the law was essentially a crude
form of withholding — a remittance method for taxing shareholder wealth.31
The 1898 excise tax on the sugar— and oil-producing industries, enacted
in response to the funding needs of the Spanish-American War,32 was
perhaps the first instance of a national levy imposed on "the occupation or
privilege of doing business" in specific industries.33 Yet, in its final form the
law operated as a blatant, rifle-shot provision aimed at taxing the gross profits
of the American Sugar Refining Company and the Standard Oil Company.34
Thus, even this temporary wartime tax, which was upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court,35 provides ample evidence for the dueling interpretations of the roots of
American corporate taxation. On the one hand, the statute’s legislative history
and its general application to all sugar and oil refinery businesses, not just
corporations, suggest that lawmakers were not singling out corporations as
regulatory targets, but rather that they were using the excise levy as a proxy
to tax the owners of sugar and oil companies, and hence generate the revenue
necessary to prosecute a war.36
On the other hand, if the ultimate targets of the tax were specifically
Standard Oil and American Sugar, two of the largest and most powerful
industrial corporations in America at the time,37 then perhaps the 1898 excise
tax was a forerunner of the legislative attempt to control the wealth and power

29 Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat. 223, 281-82. The law provided that

30
31
32
33

34
35
36
37

"the gains and profits of all companies whether incorporated or partnership . . . shall
be included in estimating the annual gains, profits, or income of any person entitled
to the same, whether divided or otherwise." Id.
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 509.
Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, § 27, 30 Stat. 448 (1898).
31 CONG. REC. 5090 (1898) (statement of Sen. Horace Chilton, an early sponsor
of the 1898 law). The 1898 levy, like the 1909 law, was specifically framed as an
"excise" tax to comply with the Pollock decision’s prohibition on unapportioned
direct taxes. Bank, Entity Theory, supra note 10, at 396.
KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, THE INCOME TAX: METHODS AND RESULTS IN VARIOUS
COUNTRIES 275 (1910); Bank, Entity Theory, supra note 10, at 399.
Spreckels Sugar Refining Company v. McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904).
Bank, Entity Theory, supra note 10, at 398-99
In 1897, Standard Oil was the largest industrial corporation in the country, with over
$256 million in total assets, and American Sugar was the third largest with $116
million in total assets. BUNTING, supra note 2, at 149.
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of corporate capital. Moreover, since the 1898 law did not contain disclosure
requirements, lawmakers seemed less concerned about transparency as a form
of public control, and more interested in using the levy to curb the growing
profits of specific corporations.38 The early versions of American national
taxation thus provide mixed guidance on whether the beginnings of U.S.
corporate taxation were rooted in regulatory desires or attempts to remit more
effectively a shareholder-level tax.
The political and legal context of the 1909 tax itself, similarly, does
little to settle the regulation/remittance debate. Like the 1898 tax, the
1909 levy was structured as an excise tax mainly to comply with the
constitutional restrictions established by the Court’s invalidation of the
1894 income tax and its support for the 1898 excise tax on sugar and oil
production.39 The legislative debates and political rhetoric underpinning the
1909 tax also demonstrate that key lawmakers held conflicting views about
the new corporate tax — conflicting views that lend credence to each side of
the competing standard historical interpretations.40
The differing interpretations of the 1909 tax can even be seen within
single key pronouncements on the need for corporate taxation. Consider, for
instance, President William Howard Taft’s June 16th message to Congress
recommending the 1909 corporate tax and a constitutional amendment
permitting an income tax without apportionment.41 By all accounts, Taft’s
leadership and his June congressional message played a pivotal role in
the passage of the corporate tax.42 In his message, Taft provided a variety
of justifications for the new revenue bill. Citing to a "rapidly increasing
deficit," the president called for tariff revision and the adoption of "new kinds
of taxation" to help "secure an adequate income" for the growing federal
government.43 More specifically, Taft supported the corporate tax both for
administrative reasons, as a possible proxy for taxing shareholders, and as

38 Although neither Kornhauser nor Avi-Yonah examine the 1898 excise tax in detail,
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the historical record surrounding the sugar and oil excise taxes supports their claims
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note 9; Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, supra note 9.
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Spreckels Sugar
Refining Company, 192 U.S. 397.
Kornhauser, supra note 9, at 94-113; Bank, Entity Theory, supra note 10, at 401-04.
U.S. PRESIDENT, TAX ON NET INCOME OF CORPORATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 61-98 (1909).
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a regulatory tool to publicize and expose the abuses of growing corporate
power, and thus to control it. For administrative reasons, Taft supported the
tax because it imposed "a burden at the source of income at a time when the
corporation is well able to pay and when collection is easy."44 As modern
scholars have noted, the focus on sources of income and collection ease
implies that Taft believed the levy could be an effective indirect means to tax
shareholder wealth.45
Other parts of Taft’s message convey a different rationale, one that
emphasizes the need for regulatory control of corporations as separate legal
entities. At the outset, Taft explained that the levy "is an excise tax upon
the privilege of doing business as an artificial entity," and hence "not a
direct tax on property." He continued that "another merit of this tax is
the federal supervision which must be exercised to make the law effective
over the annual accounts and business transactions of all corporations." Taft
acknowledged that the corporate form "has been of the utmost utility in the
business world," but he also reminded Congress that "substantially all of the
abuses and all of the evils which have aroused the public to the necessity of
reform were made possible by the use of this very faculty."46
With American society still reeling from a financial panic linked to abuses
in the banking industry and an earlier series of corporate scandals in the
insurance industry,47 Taft’s address underscored the regulatory potential of a
corporate tax. Indeed, the President spelled out how the tax in a "perfectly
legitimate and effective" way could help the government, stockholders, and
the greater public gain "knowledge of the real business transactions and the
gains and profits of every corporation in the country." By making the inner
dealings of big businesses more transparent, the corporate tax, Taft insisted,
would be a "long step toward that supervisory control of corporations which
may prevent a further abuse of power."48 Taft’s sustained emphasis on the

44 Id. at 3.
45 Bank, Entity Theory, supra note 10, at 406 ("The notion that the corporation was

a ‘source’ rather than the ‘object’ reinforced the tax’s status as a surrogate for the
income tax and the corporation’s status as a surrogate for the stockholder."). Others
have argued that Taft’s express "reference to the corporation’s ability to pay (as
opposed to the shareholders’) has a real entity overtone." Avi-Yonah, Corporations,
Society, supra note 9, at 1219.
46 S. DOC. NO. 61-98, at 3.
47 MICHAEL MCGERR, A FIERCE DISCONTENT: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PROGRESSIVE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1870-1920, at 169-74 (2003); MORTON KELLER, THE LIFE
INSURANCE ENTERPRISE, 1885-1910: A STUDY IN THE LIMITS OF CORPORATE POWER
12-14, 27-28 (1963).

48 S. DOC. NO. 61-98, at 3.
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public disclosure aspects of the law supports the interpretation of the 1909
corporate tax as a regulatory device.
Like Taft’s message, the congressional debates surrounding the 1909
law evidence multiple justifications for the corporate tax.49 Moreover, the
broader legal discourse about the shifting views of corporate personality and
the unknown incidence of corporate taxes seemed to provide contending
camps with additional, though contradictory, justifications for their respective
positions. As the Columbia University philosopher John Dewey noted in
1926, the differing theories of what constituted a corporation were infinitely
flexible, reflecting the contingency of abstract concepts. "Each theory," Dewey
succinctly explained, "has been used to serve . . . opposing ends."50
Ultimately, the search for a singular, or even a dominant, explanation for
the emergence of the 1909 corporate tax may be not only elusive, but perhaps
even counterproductive. After all, tax laws — like nearly all legislation
— frequently appeal to a variety of constituencies for a multiplicity of
reasons. Just as Baptists and bootleggers could develop a peculiar alliance
to support American prohibition, so too populist regulators and rational
administrators could come together to back the 1909 corporate tax.51
Lawmakers who harbored hostility towards large-scale business corporations
and who viewed these economic organizations as independent legal entities
could support the corporate tax as a means toward disciplining capital. At
the same time, those who believed that corporations were mere conduits that
helped generate economic prosperity could still back the corporate levy as
an effective way to collect badly needed revenue from some of the country’s
wealthiest individuals. Simply put, regulating corporate power and remitting
tax revenue were not necessarily mutually exclusive aims.
If one moves beyond the existing literature’s focus on the formalistic
regulation/remittance debate, a comparison of American national corporate
tax policy with prior and other contemporary attempts to tax corporations
may inform a broader query about the aims and achievements of U.S.
corporate taxation. Although comparativist scholars frequently turn to
transnational comparisons, contrasts between U.S. state-level laws and
policies can also be a fruitful area of inquiry.52 There was, of course, a great

49 For a sample of the conflicting congressional justifications see generally 44 CONG.

REC. 4415-4498 (1909).
50 John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE

L.J. 655, 669 (1926).
51 Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist,

7 REGULATION 12 (1983).
52 The early tax treatise writers consistently examined subnational as well as

transnational comparisons as part of their comprehensive studies of taxation.
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deal of variation among American states and commonwealths, particularly in
the tax treatment of business corporations. Nonetheless, because American
state governments often acted as "laboratories of democracy," a brief analysis
of how and why some of the leading industrializing states tried to tax
corporations may clarify the general ethos of corporate taxation that was
emerging in the United States at the time.

II. THE SUBNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: FROM CHAOS TO CONVERGENCE
Throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth, American
states imposed a number of levies on corporations. From a general property
tax to licensing fees and franchise levies to income taxes, lawmakers
consistently resorted to a variety of measures to raise revenue and regulate
large corporate businesses. Although economic experts disagreed about who
ultimately paid a tax legally imposed on corporations, the uncertainty of
incidence did not prevent lawmakers from levying a variety of corporate
taxes. Traditionally, the general property tax, which applied to the real and
personal property of corporations as well as individuals, was the main source
of revenue for subnational governments, generating a vast majority of annual
state and local tax receipts.53 Yet as the practical defects of this levy became
more acute, state lawmakers turned to other sources of revenue. Leaving the
property tax to localities, states experimented with a variety of other levies,
but business corporations remained important targets of newly created taxes
— not only because they were a lucrative source of revenue, but also because
lawmakers were concerned about the growing concentration of economic
power in these new gigantic organizations. Even when effective state-level

See, e.g., EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX (1914); KENNAN, supra note
34; HENRY CARTER ADAMS SCIENCE OF FINANCE, AN INVESTIGATION OF PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE AND PUBLIC REVENUES (New York, H. Holt & Co. 1898). More
recently, scholars working within the framework of historical institutionalism have
returned to the significance of subnational comparisons. See, e.g., ELIZABETH
S. CLEMENS, THE PEOPLE’S LOBBY: ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION AND THE
RISE OF INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES (1997); R. RUDY
HIGGENS-EVENSON, THE PRICE OF PROGRESS: PUBLIC SERVICES, TAXATION AND
THE AMERICAN CORPORATE STATE, 1877-1929 (2003).
53 As late as 1902, property taxes accounted for more than half of total state tax
revenue. 5 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 40 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds.,
millennial ed. 2006) (Series Ea247-275); John Joseph Wallis, American Government Finance in the Long
Run, 1790-1990, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 61 (2000).
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income taxes began to take hold in the early twentieth century, corporations
were central elements of these new revenue laws. The sustained state-level
approach to taxing corporations shows how American policymakers have
continued to view corporations as both a significant source of revenue and a
potentially dangerous source of power.
Although the general property tax had long been the cornerstone of state
and local revenues, the practical defects of the levy were notorious.54 While
real property such as land, buildings, and machinery was readily visible and
theoretically easy to assess, personal property posed a much greater challenge.
The general property tax in most jurisdictions covered a wide variety of
ordinary personal goods, from furniture to utensils to clocks and watches.
But, as the tax rolls of many states demonstrated, few taxpayers reported these
items as part of their personal property holdings.55 Not only did this form of
evasion undermine the civic spirit of quasi- voluntary compliance,56 but the
inability to reach intangible personal property, particularly stocks, bonds and
other financial assets — not to mention the salaries of the growing managerial
class — was the property tax’s greatest flaw.
With the rise of American industrial capitalism, the inadequacies of
reaching personal property, particularly corporate securities, became even
more pronounced. Tax experts and political activists acknowledged the
need for reform. As Columbia University political economist Edwin R.A.
Seligman explained,
Governments everywhere are confronted by the question, how to
reach the taxable capacity of the holders of these securities, or of
the associations themselves. Whom shall we tax and how shall we
tax them in order to attain a substantial justice? Perhaps no question
in the whole domain of fiscal science has been answered in a more
unsatisfactory way.57

54 CLIFTON K. YEARLEY, THE MONEY MACHINES: THE BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF

GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN THE NORTH, 1860-1920 (1970); MORTON
KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBLIC LIFE IN LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA
114 (1977); GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX
IN AMERICA (1996).
55 JOHN TEAFORD, THE RISE OF THE STATES: EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN STATE
GOVERNMENT 43-45 (2002).
56 On the global historical importance of "quasi-voluntary compliance" to the
effectiveness of tax systems, see MARGARET LEVI, OF RULE AND REVENUE (1988).
57 Edwin R.A. Seligman, The Taxation of Corporations I, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 269, 269
(1890) [hereinafter Seligman, Taxation of Corporations I]. Seligman was among the
economic experts who underscored the uncertainty of determining the incidence of
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Initially, state lawmakers had attempted to answer Seligman’s query by
applying the general property tax uniformly and consistently to all property
and all taxpayers, individuals and corporations alike. Indeed, in theory, the
general property tax was originally intended to be as comprehensive as
possible. In the antebellum period, "the distinguishing feature of the system
of state and local taxation in America may be described in one sentence,"
declared Wisconsin political economist Richard T. Ely. "It is the taxation of
all property, movable or immovable, visible or invisible, or real or personal,
as we say in America, at one uniform rate."58
Northeastern industrial states such as New York and Pennsylvania led the
way in trying to apply the general property tax to business corporations.
While numerous commonwealths had taxed banks and insurance companies
as part of broader legislation regulating financial companies,59 New York
imposed a property tax in 1823 that applied generally to "all incorporated
companies receiving a regular income from the employment of their capital."60
New York legislators reasoned that because such corporations were legal
"persons," they — like any other individual citizen of the state — were liable
to property taxes. Corporations doing business in the Empire State, therefore,
paid a tax on their real property, including buildings and machinery, and an
additional tax on their personal property, which consisted of the value of their
capital stock, or what we would refer to today as their market capitalization. As
Seligman explained, corporations "were required to make returns to the county
officers of all their property and their capital stock, paying the tax themselves
and deducting it from the dividends of stockholders." This implied that New
York taxed corporate personal property twice: once at the corporate level, and
then again at the shareholder level.61
Other states, by contrast, applied the general property tax only once
to personal corporate property. Massachusetts, for example, taxed the real
property held by corporations, but it left the taxation of corporate personal
property to be assessed and collected via the personal property tax on
shareholders.62 The distinction between Massachusetts and New York typified
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the nineteenth- century lack of uniformity and the prevailing confusion over
the potential double taxation of corporate income. Whereas some states held
firmly to the juridical view that corporations were separate entities and hence
responsible for the taxes on their property, both real and personal, other
commonwealths like Massachusetts seemed to divide the tax on real and
personal property between corporations and their shareholders, respectively.
Public finance experts bemoaned this lack of uniformity, even as they made
economic arguments about the uncertain incidence of corporate taxes.63
Given the increasing defects of the general property tax, many states
and commonwealths in the postbellum period began to move away from
trying to adapt the traditional property tax to the growing number and
variety of business corporations. Instead, they used a diversity of levies to
try to capture a corporation’s taxpaying capacity or its "ability to pay," a
phrase advocates of progressive income taxes used regularly to rally support
for their reforms. In 1868, Pennsylvania enacted one of the first general
corporate taxes aimed not at corporate property but at the net earnings
of all corporations operating in the state, as well as portions of capital
stock distributed as dividends.64 Although the levy was still described as a
tax on property, it seemed to presage the coming of state corporate income
taxes. Other states and commonwealths soon followed suit, but the tax base
and rates for these corporate levies varied widely. With over a dozen different
corporate tax bases employed by various states and commonwealths, national
tax experts, who may have been looking to state taxation for cues on how
to reform the federal fiscal structure, were bewildered by the unprincipled
patchwork of subnational tax laws. By the early 1900s, such experts could
confidently claim that "chaos" was "the only descriptive term applicable to
existing conditions in Commonwealth taxation."65
Yet despite the tremendous variation, a brief analysis of state corporate
taxes indicates that lawmakers and taxing authorities consistently kept
corporations at the center of state-level tax policy. Political leaders
throughout the country did not share the same conception of the corporation,

63 Seligman, The Taxation of Corporations III, 5 POL. SCI. Q. 636 (1890).
64 An Act to Revise, Amend, and Consolidate the Several Laws Taxing Corporations,

Brokers, and Bankers, 1868 Pa. Laws 108, §§ 4, 6; Seligman, Taxation of
Corporations I, supra note 57, at 299.
65 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & LABOR, BUREAU OF THE CORPS., TAXATION OF
CORPORATIONS II — MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES 8 (1910). Seligman had earlier
made the same claim in his characteristically eloquent style: "We have in the United
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nor did they agree on how to tax these business organizations and their
shareholders, as the "chaos" of prevailing laws illustrated. But they seemed
unified in their intentions to ensure that corporations contributed their "fair
share" to state treasuries, whether through property taxes or other levies.
Indeed, as state lawmakers equated large corporations with monopoly power,
they were able to use corporate taxes to achieve the dual aims of raising
revenue and regulating business. Consequently, nearly every industrial state
taxed corporations in some way.66
The centrality of business corporations to state tax policy was equally
evident when states and commonwealths began searching for new forms of
revenue in the early twentieth century, after many had relegated the tax on
real property to localities.67 As states and localities began to separate their
respective sources of revenue, the earlier chaos of state taxation appeared to
converge around the use of income and sales taxes as the main sources of
state tax revenue.68 Even then, lawmakers maintained their desire to make
business corporations socially and financially responsible for the support of
state government by keeping these corporations at the center of the new
levies.69
As a division of fiscal sources took shape, states emphasized why they
were the appropriate governmental unit to tax corporations. Corporations,
after all, had long been the special creatures of state charters, and even with
the advent of general incorporation laws, it was states and not localities or
the national government that breathed life into corporations and gave them
the special legal privilege of limited liability. The power of incorporation
became a particularly pertinent issue when reform proposals supporting
federal incorporation began to gain currency in the early twentieth century. A
variety of economic and political interests favored federal incorporation both
as a regulatory tool and as a way to rationalize the vagaries of a multiplicity of
state corporate laws. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Taft both supported
the measure, but it was proponents of states’ rights who challenged federal
incorporation as an assault on the time-honored American tradition of fiscal
federalism.70 Indeed, these opponents recognized that federal incorporation
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would not only undermine the political power of state governments, it would
also threaten a valuable source of revenue, since state-level incorporation was
one of the justifications for the numerous "franchise taxes," "license fees," and
"corporate organization taxes" that littered state statutes. These levies were
the price that corporations had to pay in exchange for the benefit and privilege
of state incorporation. And it was a price state lawmakers believed they had a
right to extract under the principles of American fiscal federalism — a point
that national lawmakers opposed to the 1909 national corporate tax frequently
highlighted.71
Policymakers also argued that because of the sprawling nature of
modern business corporations, states had a comparative advantage in taxing
corporations. The state ought to "tax all those industries and classes
of property sometimes called ‘corporate’" reasoned the California tax
commission in 1906, because corporations exist across "many communities,
serve all, and all contribute to its income."72 Consequently, only state
governments had the administrative and institutional capacity, the California
commission self-servingly claimed, to handle the taxation of large-scale
corporations in an equitable, uniform, and just manner.73 In time, the growing
national reach of business corporations would provide federal officials with
a similar rationale to tax corporations. Based on the California commission’s
analysis, the Golden State pioneered the use of a multitude of corporate taxes as
substitutes for the property tax at around the same time that Congress enacted
the 1909 corporate tax. While national lawmakers were carefully constructing
the corporate excise tax, legislators in Sacramento experimented with a variety
of moderate levies on the gross earnings of different business corporations,
particularly public utilities.74 In the end, the slew of corporate levies did
not turn out to be the revenue panacea that the California commission had
anticipated, but the initial use of corporate taxes as substitutes for the failing
property tax illustrates how business corporations were never far from the
minds of lawmakers and taxing authorities.
Beside the institutional and administrative rationales, state governments
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focused on taxing corporations because doing so pleased particular political
interests, namely small local businesses, and because big business was
perceived to be a threat to republican values and democratic decisionmaking. As legal and economic historians have shown, the late nineteenthcentury tensions between state governments and large-scale corporations
were rooted in the desire to protect the economic interests of local merchants
and manufacturers.75 Not only did state governments use licensing laws and
antitrust legislation to curb the growing power of large national corporations,
they also relied on the critical distinction between the taxation of domestic
versus foreign corporations to support local businesses. Although states did
not have the authority to tax the "franchise" or the "the right to exist as
a corporation," they could and did tax foreign corporations frequently for
carrying on business within their jurisdictions, as long as such franchise taxes
did not interfere with interstate commerce.76
Likewise, subnational American tax laws and policies responded to
social concerns about the growing economic and political power of large
corporations. Throughout American popular culture, corporations were
depicted as callous profit-maximizers oblivious to community interests
and democratic ideals. Railroad regulators such as Charles Francis Adams,
Jr. and novelists like Frank Norris revealed the financial and political
chicanery that railroad owners and managers frequently engaged in as
part of their unyielding desire for the acquisition of wealth.77 When large
national corporations attempted to influence state legislatures, lawmakers
often responded by using tax policy to try to discipline corporate businesses.
Many state tax commissions, for example, viewed corporations as competitors
rather than clients. Accordingly, they tried to insulate legislators from business
interests, while enhancing the authority of their own expertise in the process.78
In the end, the institutional structure of American federalism, to be sure, gave
state lawmakers an opportunity to exercise their power, but how and where
such power was used would often be determined by political interests and
cultural beliefs. Attempts to protect small, local merchants from large-scale
competitors and the cultural antagonism towards big business demonstrated
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that despite the various ways in which states taxed corporations, these new
economic organizations remained central to fiscal reform.
Though state tax commissioners may have sought to tax corporations
as a way to consolidate their own power, autonomy, and prestige, the
logic that underpinned their actions also paralleled a broader conceptual
revolution regarding the meaning of taxation. In this way, corporate tax
policy was part and parcel of the broader intellectual currents sweeping
through American progressivism. Like other political activists, progressive
tax reformers contended that the dramatic changes wrought by modern
industrialization and urbanization had undermined the traditional explanation
for regressive and antiquated levies like the property tax. Given the
tremendous interdependence of modern life, taxes could no longer be
justified under a "benefits theory" as simply the price paid for government
protection. Instead, reformers advanced what they believed to be a more
equitable principle of taxation based on a citizen’s faculty or "ability to
pay." This principle promoted a more active role for the positive state in
the distribution of fiscal burdens.79 Taxing corporations based not on their
property, but on their earning capacity, was one way to put into practice this
new and emerging view of taxation.
In summarizing the development of state tax laws, national officials echoed
the importance of taxing corporations according to their ability to pay. "There
is a marked tendency in all these States toward making earning power the
basis of taxation for quasi-public corporations," wrote George Clapperton
of the U.S. Industrial Commission in 1901. "Properly directed, this must
be regarded as the correct principle and capable of practical application to
such corporations under existing industrial conditions."80 While Clapperton’s
comments referred specifically to quasi-public corporations, or what we would
today call public utilities, the principle soon spread to cover all corporations.
By 1909, federal tax officials conceded that even the precise definition of
taxation itself had shifted. A tax, opined the U.S. Bureau of Corporations, "is
a payment exacted by government as a source of general revenue and not as
an equivalent of a specific benefit."81 When it came to explaining the multitude
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of state-level corporate taxes, the Bureau admitted that there were still two
prevailing theories justifying levies on corporations, but it emphasized that
"the preference is commonly given to the theory that each person, natural or
artificial, should contribute to governmental support according to his ability
to pay."82 Indeed, the Bureau contended that corporations provided "a place
where the theoretically perfect test — ability to earn — can be applied in
practice as a means of ascertaining the proper amount of taxes to be paid."
Unlike individuals, for whom the ability to pay was difficult to measure and
perhaps even more challenging to apply, corporations were uniquely situated
to measure future earning power. "The market value of the stock depends not
wholly upon past earnings, but also, and chiefly, upon the supposed ability
to earn in the future," wrote the Bureau. As a result, corporations faced a
special tax "burden which is theoretically correct and which is balanced by
the advantages enjoyed," and one that "may well be taken into account when
one discusses whether it is to the public interest to encourage the formation of
corporations."83
The public interest in taxing corporations was perhaps most visible when
state lawmakers turned to income taxes as a substitute for the property
tax in the early 1900s. Even here, corporations were at the heart of policy
innovations. To be sure, there was tremendous initial resistance to the
introduction of a peacetime income tax at the state level — resistance that
was, rhetorically at least, deeply rooted in American political culture. "A
general income tax is un- American," proclaimed Carl Plehn on behalf of
the California tax commission. "Our people have so much respect for labor
that what is won by honest toil is regarded as sacred and not to be reduced
by direction taxation."84
Plehn’s focus on labor was telling. Although the first effective state
income taxes were levied on both individuals and corporations, there was
great concern among contemporaries that an income tax could be used
to punish the working class. When Wisconsin imposed the first effective
state-level income tax in 1911 with a graduated levy on personal and
corporate incomes, supporters of the measure had to assure voters that
the common laborer was not the target of the new income tax. "The man
who depends upon his manual labor for a living will pay no income tax
whatsoever," explained Nils P. Haugen, the Wisconsin tax commissioner.
The new law did "not assess anybody unless he has some net revenue above

82 Id. at 7.
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the mere needs of existence."85 This implied that wealthy individuals, many
of whom were corporate shareholders, and, of course, corporate businesses
would bear the brunt of the early Wisconsin income tax, as they did. Wisconsin
reformers were thus able to rely on the peculiarly American valorization of
labor over capital to implement what would become a model income tax
system that other states and commonwealths would soon follow.86
From New York’s 1823 corporate property tax to Wisconsin’s 1911
income tax, corporations occupied a pivotal place in the development of
state-level tax policy. Although in earlier periods state corporate tax policies
consisted of a chaotic mix of revenue measures, by the late nineteenth
century and into the early twentieth many states began to converge on
a seemingly unified policy of taxing corporate earnings, as part of a
broader attempt to substantiate a new socio-legal fiscal order based on
a citizen’s faculty or ability to pay. This apparent convergence can be
attributed in part to institutional factors like the special role that state
governments have played in the intergovernmental relations of American
fiscal federalism. Equally significant were other socio-political determinants
like the intentions of state lawmakers to insulate democratic decision-making
from the potentially corrupting influence of big businesses, as well as the
desire to protect small, local businesses from the domination of the colossal
corporate enterprises that crisscrossed state lines. The latter stemmed from
an antimonopoly tradition deeply rooted in American political culture. The
American cultural aversion to concentrations of economic power may also
explain why state-level income taxes appeared to target wealthy individuals
and businesses rather than members of the working class.
From a present day perspective, the American subnational fascination
with taxing large corporations may seem rather unremarkable. After all,
if corporations were a rich source of revenue, or a threatening locus of
political and economic power, one should not be surprised to see lawmakers
wielding tax policy to tap corporate revenue or to control corporate power.
Yet a transnational historical perspective on the development of corporate
tax policy may suggest that perhaps the unique confluence of American
institutions, culture, and ideas can also explain the U.S. propensity to
use tax policy to try to discipline corporate capitalism. To be sure, U.S.

85 Nils P. Haugen, The Wisconsin Income Tax, 6 ST. & LOCAL TAX’N 324, 324 (1913).
86 JOHN D. BUENKER, THE HISTORY OF WISCONSIN, VOL. IV: THE PROGRESSIVE

ERA, 1893-1914 (1998); W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, PROGRESSIVISM AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE WISCONSIN INCOME TAX, 1911- 1929 (1974); Ajay K. Mehrotra,
Forging Fiscal Reform: Constitutional Change, Public Policy, and the Creation of
Administrative Capacity in Wisconsin, 1880-1920, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 94 (2008).
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lawmakers were steeped in a political culture that had long been suspicious of
monopoly power. This tradition was evident not only in the way subnational
governments consistently focused on corporations as targets of tax laws and
policies, but also in the way that American lawmakers seemed especially
receptive to academic theories about corporations as separate legal entities
— entities that could, if not controlled, become significant threats to a
functioning capitalist democracy.

III. THE TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE:
VARIETIES OF MANAGERIAL CAPITALISM,
BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RELATIONS,
AND THEORIES OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY
While American lawmakers, at both the state and national level, were using
corporate tax policy to try to curb the growth of big business and effectively
raise revenue, their counterparts across the Atlantic seem to have had a rather
different perspective on the emergence of industrial capitalism. For a variety
of reasons, the United States and the United Kingdom seemed to occupy
opposite ends of the comparative tax and political economy spectrum. First,
material and historical distinctions in the two countries related to the rise
of large-scale corporations led to fundamental differences in management
structures within big businesses.87 Second, because the British had a rich
and strong civil service tradition, state bureaucratic and regulatory power
preceded and in many ways shaped some of England’s earliest and largest
pre-industrial business corporations. Consequently, British political economy
seems to have been more congenial to the interests of big business, or at least
less antagonistic, than the environment in the United States.88
Finally, the differences in the structures of managerial capitalism and
business- government relations were reflected in the legal theories that
underpinned corporate, or what the British referred to as "company," law.

87 Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Emergence of Managerial Capitalism, 58 BUS.

HIST. REV. 473 (1984) [hereinafter Chandler, Managerial Capitalism]; see also,
CHANDLER, supra note 11. For a reinterpretation of Chandler’s comparison of
Anglo-American business history, see Geoffrey Jones, Great Britain: Big Business,
Management, and Competitiveness in Twentieth-Century Britain, in BIG BUSINESS
AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 102 (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Franco Amatori &
Takashi Hikino eds., 1997).
88 Chandler, supra note 22; Thomas K. McCraw, Business and Government: The
Origins of the Adversary Relationship, 26 CAL. MGMT. REV. 33 (1984).
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In the United States legal theorists and jurists absorbed Germanic notions
of corporate personality that reinforced the American cultural aversion to
economic concentration; as a result, Americans were more willing to treat
corporations as separate legal entities.89 Meanwhile, lawyers and judges in
England seemed oblivious to continental ideas about the collectivist nature of
corporations, and consequently they maintained that corporations were merely
agents of individual shareholders.90 This triad of differences — differences
in organizational structures, in the context of political economy, and in legal
theory and culture — help explain the dramatic divergence in U.S. and U.K.
corporate tax policy. It was thus a confluence of economic, intellectual, and
cultural factors that channeled the U.S. in one historical direction toward a
"classical" system of taxing corporate income twice, and sent the U.K on an
opposite path of integrating corporate and personal income taxes.
Yet, if the United States and Britain represent two competing tax
perspectives, Germany seems to occupy a peculiar intermediary position.
In many ways, the corporate management structure of large-scale German
industrial firms mirrored their American counterparts, though financial
institutions played a much larger role in German management than in
the United States.91 In the realm of political economy, however, Germany
with its strong civil service and bureaucratic capacity had many similarities
with England; both lacked a stark distinction between the public and private
realm. And in the area of corporate theory, German jurists, like American
lawyers, seemed more willing to view corporations as separate legal entities.
As a result, Prussian corporate taxes, on the one hand, paralleled and in some
sense foreshadowed the American system of taxing corporate income twice.
On the other hand, since the German culture of managerial capitalism was
more concerned with fostering industrial cooperation, Prussian authorities
did not appear preoccupied with punishing capital owners; thus, the Prussian
fiscal system provided a modicum of tax relief to corporate shareholders. This
commitment to mitigating the double taxation of corporate income placed

89 Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,

88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business
Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 (1987); Ron Harris, The
Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality Theories: From
German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1421 (2006).
90 DAUNTON, JUST TAXES, supra note 13, at 93; Harris, supra note 89.
91 ROE, supra note 19, at 60-61, 171-73.
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Prussia squarely in-between the early twentieth-century U.S. and British
corporate tax systems.92
A. Contrasting the United States and England
In the United States, as we have seen, there was vast disagreement, especially
during the debates over the 1909 corporate tax, about the proper role of
corporations in the development of federal income tax policy. For those
who viewed the corporation as simply an aggregation of individuals, the
appropriate tax treatment followed the tax treatment of partnerships: an
income tax was imposed only on the owners of corporate capital, not on the
business entities themselves. This view supported a pass-through model of
taxation that was implemented as part of the Civil War and 1894 income
taxes; both measures imposed a levy on the corporation as a proxy for a tax
on stockholders.93 With the emergence of American managerial capitalism,
and the attendant separation of corporate ownership and control, the real entity
view of the corporation seemed to gain traction just as the political antagonism
towards big business increased. As a result, American lawmakers turned their
focus more directly toward corporations.
Although scholars have disagreed about the meaning and intent of the
1909 U.S. corporate tax, nearly all concur that it marks a critical juncture
in the path-dependent development of American corporate tax policy.94
The modern American system of corporate taxation may not have been fully
established until World War I, when the United States expressly eliminated
the personal exemption for all dividends and thus began the deliberate and
broadly based double taxation of corporate income.95 Still, the 1909 corporate
tax certainly signaled a major transformation in the way lawmakers envisioned
the role of the modern business corporation in the new fiscal order.
In England, by contrast, there appears to have been a greater degree
of continuity and consensus; not only in corporate tax policy, but in the
broader historical conditions that shaped tax laws. The United Kingdom, for
example, remained committed to a form of family capitalism that contrasted
sharply with the modern managerial capitalism taking hold in the United

92 HARRIS, supra note 13 , at 82-83.
93 Bank, Entity Theory, supra note 10, at 394-95; Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society,

supra note 9, at 1212- 15.
94 See sources cited supra notes 9-10.
95 W. Elliot Brownlee, Wilson and Financing the Modern State: The Revenue

Act of 1916, 129 PROC. AM. PHIL. ASS’N 173 (1985); W. Elliot Brownlee,
Historical Perspective on U.S. Tax Policy, in DOES ATLAS SHRUG? THE ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF TAXING THE RICH 44 (Joel B. Slemrod ed., 2000).
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States.96 In England, there also appears to have been less antagonism between
government and business because of the co-evolution of large pre-industrial
corporate enterprises and parliamentary power. Among British jurists and
company law experts, moreover, there seems to have been less disagreement
about the meaning of corporate personality, and hence some early consensus
on the taxation, or rather non-taxation, of distributed corporate profits.
One of the most prominent differences between the U.S. and U.K. that may
explain the divergence in corporate taxation was the contrasting corporate
management structures that took hold in the two nations. While large-scale
industrial business corporations in both countries came to the fore at roughly
the same time by integrating mass production with volume distribution, there
were conspicuous distinctions in the way that these economic organizations
were managed. These differences may have had profound effects on the
cultural perception of corporations and, in turn, on the way that public
power was used to regulate business enterprises. Whereas in the United
States a hierarchy of professional, salaried managers had by 1900 come
to supervise and control the everyday operations of many large, integrated
business corporations, in the United Kingdom industrialists seemed reluctant
to relinquish control of their enterprises to non-family managers. British
holding companies, for instance, frequently remained under the control of
family estates or federations of family firms well into the mid-1900s. Even
in the largest English business corporations, "owners continued to have
much greater say in top management decisions than did their American
counterparts."97
The British commitment to family capitalism may explain why English
tax law continued to see companies as the agents of individual owners,
rather than as separate entities, and why the English imposed only one layer
of taxation on corporate income. If family owners were simultaneously
the leading managers of corporate enterprises, it would certainly be easier
to accept corporations as single agents, or as aggregations of individual
shareholders. Without a rigid hierarchy of corporate managers mediating

96 Although business historians have disagreed about when managerial capitalism

finally replaced family capitalism in the U.K, most would concur that "prior to
1914 family dominance was very much the prevalent pattern in the U.K.’s public
companies." Brian R. Cheffins, Law, Economics, and the UK’s System of Corporate
Governance: Lessons from History, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 71, 82 (2001). For more on
the history of British corporate governance, see generally CHANDLER, supra note
11, ch. 7; LESLIE HANNAH, THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE ECONOMY chs. 7-9 (1976).
97 Chandler, Managerial Capitalism, supra note 87, at 496; see also, CHANDLER, supra
note 11.
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between the firm and a dispersed set of owners, jurists and tax experts could
genuinely contend that, in England, a corporation and its owners were one
and the same.
The identity between corporate ownership and control in England was also
the product of long-term historical processes. Whereas in the United States
the development of national administrative capacity came mainly after the
rise of big business, in the United Kingdom the economic powers of large
corporations co-evolved with the political powers of the public sector.98
Consequently, big business was not seen as a threat to political power. In
fact, large- scale business enterprises were conditioned from an early stage
to look upon the state as their initial source of power. As economic and legal
historians have demonstrated, in Britain the grant or concession theory of the
corporation dominated legal doctrine and economic thinking for much of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. According to this theory, the privilege of
incorporation was granted by the state, which made a concession of public
power for private use and frequently granted monopoly rights. Unlike the
American context, the concession theory in England led to the early creation
of numerous comparatively large joint-stock business corporations.99
Indeed, large-scale pre-industrial corporations had long been a staple of
British political economy. From the East India Company to the Bank of
England to the numerous insurance and canal companies, British businesses
regularly adopted the corporate form. Even when the Companies Act
of 1844 institutionalized general incorporation, the concession theory of
corporate personality continued to dominate, not only because parliament
maintained the technical power to grant incorporation,100 but because the
British state, unlike the American, was relatively coequal with big business
in size and power.101 Thus, while the concession theory was dominant in both
the U.S. and England, the historical sequence of material events, namely the
early existence of large-scale British corporations, led to differences in the
application of concession theory.
Indeed, the early continuity of concession theory in England and
the material development of large business corporations alongside the
administrative state may help explain why British authorities were less

98 Chandler, supra note 22. On the rise of American national administrative capacity,

see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920 (1982).
99 RON HARRIS, INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844, at 112-13, 43-45 (2000).
100 Id. at 112-14.
101 Chandler, supra note 22; McCraw, supra note 88.

520

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 11:491

hostile to the emergence of big business. But as new ideas about corporate
personality began to emerge, legal theorists in the U.K. and U.S. took
notice, though with different implications. At the turn of the twentieth
century, continental ideas about the collectivist nature of corporations as
real or natural, not artificial, entities began to influence British and American
legal thinkers.102 The eminent British legal historian, Frederic W. Maitland,
began translating the work of the German jurist Otto von Gierke, the leading
continental proponent of depicting corporations as real or organic entities.
In the United States, the legal scholar Ernst Freund was doing the same
for American audiences, as he incorporated Gierke’s ideas into his classic
monograph, The Legal Nature of the Corporation.103 Although Gierke had
little to say about business corporations, perhaps because they did not play a
dominant role in German political economy when he was writing, his focus
on the Teutonic roots of fellowship and association shaped real entity theory
more generally, and in subsequent decades his ideas had a profound impact on
the transplantation of Germanic ideas into other national contexts.104
If English and American legal thinkers were equally inspired by German
concepts, they applied these ideas to differing economic conditions and
political and legal cultures. In England, where large-scale corporations
developed simultaneously and equally with the growth of the regulatory
state and where family owners frequently retained control of large business
corporations, Maitland’s work seems to have had little immediate influence
on British legal doctrine, especially in the context of corporate tax policy.
To be sure, British legal culture and its complex interactions between
legal academics and pragmatic judges may have restrained explicit judicial
references to Maitland or Gierke and the legal conception of the corporation.
But material economic circumstances, namely the types of English family
corporations that shared power with a robust civil service, also shaped
intellectual constructs of the corporation. Regardless of the cause, English
judges seem to have taken it for granted that business companies were
merely agents of individual shareholders.105
By contrast, American jurists embraced, however haltingly, Freund’s
elevation of the autonomy of corporations. Unlike their British counterparts,

102 Horwitz, supra note 89, at 179-80.
103 ERNST FREUND, THE LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (Chicago, Univ. of Chi.
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early twentieth-century American judges seem to have been more willing to
turn to the work of treatise writers and legal academics. Freund’s juridical
notion of corporations as separate legal entities also resonated with the
changing material conditions of American society and the antimonopoly
tradition of American political culture. With big business preceding the rise
of the active federal state, and the separation of ownership and control
occurring earlier in the United States, it is no surprise that the theory
of the corporation as a real entity was ascendant. Likewise, the notion
of corporations having separate legal personalities corresponded with the
hostile intentions ascribed to these giant economic organizations. If the
industrial corporation could be depicted as a greedy octopus seeking to
extend its tentacles throughout American society, then surely such soulless
economic entities could be seen as occupying a distinct space in the legal
order.106
Nowhere perhaps was the Anglo-American variation more apparent
than in the differing application of corporate law theories to corporate
tax policy. While American jurists were writing volume after volume of
dense treatises on corporate taxation, often focusing on those American
states and continental jurisdictions that consciously taxed corporations
as separate entities,107 British legal experts had conspicuously little to say
about the taxation of business corporations, or what they referred to as
"companies." Indeed, the silence was deafening. Although there was some
case law supporting the application of the British income tax to public
companies, such as those created to manage navigable waterways,108 English
jurists seem to have taken it for granted that business corporations ought not to
be taxed separately from their owners. Cultural distinctions and historicallyrooted material differences between American and British conceptions of the
corporation seem to have had a significant effect on tax policy.
Indeed, if one defines culture as the unstated beliefs and ideas of a
particular group, the silence of British jurisprudence during this period
is particularly revealing. According to the dictates of the early British
schedular system of income taxation, corporations were clearly "persons"
for the purposes of determining the residency of incorporated businesses.109

106 Mark, supra note 89, at 1465-66; DUXBURY, supra note 105, at 5-22; NORRIS,

supra note 77.
107 See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 76; KENNAN, supra note 34.
108 Mersey Docks & Harbour Board v. Lucas, (1883) 8 App. Cas. 891; ARTHUR M.
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109 ELLIS, supra note 108, at 92.

522

Theoretical Inquiries in Law

[Vol. 11:491

But when it came to the potential double taxation of corporate income, the
English income tax in effect exempted stockholders from the income tax
when corporations were taxed on their "annual profits or gains" under the
definitions of Schedule D.110 British jurists did not generally explain why
they believed that only one layer of tax ought to be imposed on corporate
income, at least not until they began experimenting with their own form of an
American-influenced "classical" corporate income tax in the 1920s.
In fact, up until the Great War, British lawmakers and legal scholars
seemed content to use the company income tax as an indirect collection
device for a levy aimed at shareholders. Technically, the law imposed a tax
on the "annual profits and gains" of a company "before any dividend shall
be paid," but because shareholders were entitled to a credit for income taxes
paid by the company, the law effectively created an imputation system. The
company essentially remitted a tax that could be imputed to shareholders.111
The revenue demands of World War I and the social tensions that
accompanied the global conflict placed great pressure on existing tax
systems. Consequently, British lawmakers turned to a novel Excess Profits
Duty, a graduated tax imposed on profits above a statutorily provided rate
of return on capital.112 The Excess Profits Duty began the English experiment
with taxing corporations as separate legal entities. Unsurprisingly, British
tax theorists justified the new company tax not on legal grounds, not on
the principle popular in the United States at the time that corporations were
separate juridical entities with their own ability to pay. Rather, the English
used the "benefits theory" of taxation to contend that corporations ought to be
taxed because they availed themselves of the benefits provided by the state.
Josiah Stamp, the economist and Inland Revenue official, justified the separate
tax on the grounds that the national state provided both the general economic
environment that facilitated business prosperity, and the specific demand for
wartime goods that created astronomical business profits.113 By relying on the
"benefits" theory of taxation, English theorists could continue to maintain that
business corporations were merely agents rather than separate taxable entities
with their own ability to pay.

110 See, e.g., Income Tax Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 35, § 54 (Eng.).
111 SEAN REAMONN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CORPORATE TAX 29 (1970); HARRIS,
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the War: State, Society and Taxation in Britain 1917-24, 111 ENG. HIST. REV. 882
(1996).
113 J.C. Stamp, The Special Taxation of Business Profits in Relation to the Present
Position of National Finance, 20 ECON. J. 411 (1919).

2010]

The Public Control of Corporate Power

523

After World War I, the British transformed the Excess Profits Duty into a
general corporate income tax, but it was used only as a temporary measure to
address the enormous postwar debt. Comparative tax experts like Harrison
B. Spaulding explained later why the corporate income tax did not initially
gain currency in England as a viable source of revenue. "Corporations,
except for convenience of collection of the tax, are not treated as taxable
entities. The underlying theory is that the income tax is to be imposed
only on individuals and in accordance with their taxable capacity," wrote
Spaulding. In England, this meant that
A corporation is regarded merely as a device by means of which a
number of individuals can conveniently do business, and it is not
looked upon as a separate object of taxation. It is not in itself a
potentially taxable person, but is an aggregation of persons who
may or may not be taxable. It is necessary for some purposes that
corporations be regarded as separate legal entities, but the British do
not extend this conception to the field of income tax.114
Though tax commentators noted the contending conceptual views of the
corporation that undergirded the difference in tax treatment, they also
realized that, at bottom, this intellectual or cultural distinction was based
on a long and peculiar material history of American antagonism between
business and government. The U.S. treatment of corporations as separate
legal entities was a doctrine, noted Spaulding, that "is so well settled, and
has been established so long, that it has no doubt had its effect on the popular
mind."115
Part of the reason for the American obsession with taxing corporations
was surely the durable state-level U.S. tradition of taxing corporations. Yet,
this tradition itself was rooted in the deep-seated American aversion to
concentrations of economic power, an aversion that was expressed in the
popular distrust of large-scale business corporations. "In any discussion of
the development of ideas regarding corporations in the United States it must
be remembered that they have frequently been regarded as possible or actual
sources of evil, and accordingly are objects of suspicion," noted Spaulding.
"Practically all ‘big business’ is carried on by means of corporations,"
and thus "there is a feeling that if corporations are heavily taxed the
tax will fall most heavily on the wealthier part of the community." The

114 HARRISON B. SPAULDING, THE INCOME TAX IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED
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counterintuitive nature of American corporate tax policy seemed readily
apparent to contemporary observers like Spaulding: the purported home of
anti-statism and laissez-faire political economy seemed surprisingly eager in
using tax policy to discipline corporate capital. "While in the United States
Socialism as a political creed has little following," concluded Spaulding, "yet
in few countries have there been tax laws so pleasing to Socialists as those
of the United States."116 While the U.S. and the U.K., as Spaulding observed,
seemed to occupy opposite ends of the corporate income tax spectrum, other
industrializing European nations such as Germany appeared to be paving a
middle path between these two extremes.
B. German Organized Capitalism and an Intermediate Form of
Corporate Taxation
The German Empire (Reich) that emerged from the diverse array of
principalities and free cities in the late nineteenth century was, like most
modern Western nation-states, a country coping with the dislocations
of industrialization. Although unified Germany, under the stewardship
of Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm II, was a parliamentary,
constitutional monarchy and one of the world’s leading industrial powers
(second only to Britain), a great deal of political and economic power was
dispersed throughout the intergovernmental divisions of a federated state.117
Nevertheless, the dominance of Prussia and Berlin were evident throughout
the economic and social policies adopted by the Reich in the late 1800s.
While tariffs and other indirect taxes remained a source of revenue for the
central nation-state, Prussia led the way with direct taxes: in 1891 it enacted a
moderately progressive, broadly based personal income tax that also applied
to the income of business corporations. The corporate tax, though, provided
a limited amount of relief from the potential double taxation of corporate
income by permitting a deduction for a small percentage of a company’s

116 Id. at 93-94. Modern British historians have bolstered Spaulding’s interpretation:

Corporate taxation did not have a purchase in British fiscal policy, for it
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return on capital. As a result, Prussia seems to have set German corporate tax
policy on its own special path (Sonderweg).118
There are many reasons why Prussian corporate tax policy may have
ventured off onto a middle path between the extremes of American
"classical" corporate taxation and the British system of proto-integration.
One of the most salient factors was certainly the strong German tradition of
viewing corporations as real entities. As we have seen, Gierke’s ideas about
corporations embodying the communal notion of fellowship were quite
popular in mid-nineteenth century Germany, and these notions subsequently
had a significant impact on American, if not British, corporate law and
tax policy.119 Although Gierke’s influence may have preceded the rise of big
business in Germany, the concept of the business corporation as a separate real
and legal entity created by the state’s monopoly on the power of incorporation
remained important for German legal thought.120 As a result, it is unsurprising
that Prussia and other German states employed a classical system of corporate
taxation, imposing one levy on business corporations qua corporations, and
a second layer of tax on the shareholders of such business enterprises. In
that sense, Prussian corporate tax policy seemed to mirror certain aspects of
nineteenth-century U.S. subnational business taxes, and the early twentiethcentury national income taxes that imposed double taxation on the highest
income earners.
Yet, if the salience of corporate personality theories in Germany and
the United States can explain why the Prussian corporate tax resembled
the American system, a puzzle remains as to why Prussian authorities
provided some tax relief to commercial entities in the calculation of the
first layer of corporate taxation. Since the antagonism between American
business and government may explain why the early U.S. "soak-the-rich" tax
laws treated capital owners harshly, an exploration of turn-of-the-century
German political economy may help account for Prussia’s intermediate
type of corporate taxation. Scholars have long noted the unique form
of "organized capitalism" or "cooperative managerial capitalism" that
emerged in Germany in the late nineteenth century.121 As business historians
have demonstrated, the German experience with advanced industrialization

118 Grossfeld & Bryce, supra note 12, at 235-36; HARRIS, supra note 13, at 82.
119 See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
120 MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
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Dunlavy & Welskopp, supra note 18.
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paralleled that of the U.S., more so than the U.K. Because German business
leaders, like their American counterparts, made the "three-pronged investment
in manufacturing, marketing, and management essential to exploit fully the
economies of scale and scope, they became first movers in many of the new
capital-intensive industries, not only in their homeland but in all of Europe."122
As a result, managerial hierarchies in the largest German firms emulated, to a
certain degree, those found in the United States.
German big business was more distinctive, however, in other ways, which
may have affected the broad contours of comparative tax policy. In terms of
financing, German corporations relied much more heavily than American
or British companies on banks and other financial institutions.123 Bankers
in Britain, for instance, usually played a role in management decisions only
when a firm or industry became severely distressed. Likewise, investment
bankers in the United States became more involved with big business
mainly during merger booms, providing new capital and strategic advice
to top management.124 By contrast, in the highly capital-intensive German
industries, large banks provided critical early-stage financing and continued
funding support, and as a consequence bankers were important corporate
board members who participated in top-level business decision-making.125
The convergence of finance capital and commercial industrialism in
Wilhelmine Germany was in many ways the function of a broader historical
and cultural environment in which bureaucratic traditions and legal rules
fostered a cooperative ethos, not only between firms, but also between state
and economy. In some of Germany’s largest corporate enterprises, such as
the electrical manufacturing firm Siemens, the size and mentality of the
managerial staff followed the pre-industrial bureaucratic traditions of the
Prussian civil service. White-collar business managers were referred to as
Beamte, or civil servants, because they complied with a state- bureaucratic
model of decision-making and its strict lines of command and control.126
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The private adherence to a formal, rational model of public bureaucratic
management was rooted in the strong German civil service tradition. After
all, the German railroads — those pivotal global harbingers of the modern
industrial corporation — had been nationalized under Bismarck’s rule, and
thus railroads were in effect managed by the German civil service. In
addition, since nationalization obviated the need for a federal regulatory
commission, like the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission, there was less
opposition to the rate-making process in Germany, and hence less antagonism
towards the rise of big business. In essence, as one leading German
historian has noted, "the German rate setting mechanism was basically
more parliamentary than juridical or adversary."127 With German railroads
leading the way in adopting a public civil service model of management, it is
unsurprising that many of the largest German corporations followed suit.
While the German tradition of bureaucratic public management influenced
the development of private modes of corporate governance and cooperative
relations between state and society, the German legal system was even more
significant in facilitating inter-firm collaboration and hence in cultivating a
legal culture that viewed big business as working with, rather than against,
the public interest. This broader legal culture of commercial cooperation,
in turn, may explain why Prussian lawmakers sought to mitigate the double
taxation of corporate profits. The most salient legal difference between
Germany and other Western industrial nations at the turn of the century was
the German encouragement of cartelization. Whereas the Anglo- American
legal framework privileged competition and consolidation over cooperation
and cartelization, German laws and courts enforced cartel agreements and
other contractual arrangements among competitors as furthering the public
interest.128 The U.K. common law prohibited combinations in restraint of
trade. And the U.S., with its long-standing antimonopoly tradition, not only
demonized large concentrations of economic power, American courts refused
to enforce cartel agreements and Congress enacted formalistic prohibitions
like the Sherman Anti-trust Act explicitly barring inter-firm cooperative
arrangements.129
By contrast, the German legal system encouraged inter-firm cooperation.

127 Detlev F. Vagts, Railroads, Private Enterprise, and Public Policy: Germany and the

United States, 1870-1920, in LAW AND THE FORMATION OF THE BIG ENTERPRISES
IN THE NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES 604, 613 (Norbert Horn &
Jurgen Kocka eds., 1979).
128 Dunlavy & Welskopp, supra note 18, at 50-52; DOBBIN, supra note 25, at 3, 87.
129 TONY FREYER, REGULATING BIG BUSINESS: ANTITRUST IN GREAT BRITAIN AND

AMERICA, 1880-1990, at 25-26 (1992); Dunlavy & Welskopp, supra note 18, at 51.
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The German Empire did not have any common law prohibitions or any
legislative enactments against cartels. German courts, in fact, regularly
upheld contractual arrangements whereby competitors set output, prices, and
market allocations. When these contractual agreements proved insufficient,
German firms frequently formed a more formal consortium or syndicate
known as a "community of interest" (Interessengemeinschaft), which
entailed more sophisticated and detailed pooling arrangements. Although
these arrangements were often short-lived, the formal legalization of cartels
set German law and political economy apart from the U.S. and U.K.130
Similarly, differences in incorporation laws and corporate governance
policies between Germany and the United States also influenced the
contrasting structure of business organizations. In the U.S., incorporation
laws were the ambit of state governments, which at the turn of the century
competed intensely with one another to attract corporations by enacting
lenient conditions for incorporation. This American state-level competition
hastened the pace of incorporation and permitted such innovations as holding
companies which facilitated mergers and eased the process of corporate
consolidation.131 Likewise, the American shift in shareholder rights away
from a democratic notion of one vote per shareholder to the more plutocratic
conception of one vote per share also permitted investors to purchase
controlling power in corporations and thus enabled the concentration of
economic power.132 In the German Reich, by contrast, incorporation law
remained a national prerogative with strict conditions. The imperial laws of
incorporation set stringent requirements for the issuance of shares and the
required amount of capitalization before granting legal powers. Moreover,
although German law did not mandate shareholder voting rights, by the
early twentieth century it was still common for many German firms to
limit the voting rights of large shareholders. These two central differences
in legal culture — in incorporation laws and in the degree of acceptable

130 Morton Keller, Regulation of Large Enterprise: The United States Experience
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ENTERPRISE 492 (Peter Mathias & M.M. Postan eds., 1978); CHANDLER, supra
note 11, at 423-25.
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132 Dunlavy & Welskopp, supra note 18, at 55-56.

2010]

The Public Control of Corporate Power

529

shareholder power — "made it much easier to merger companies in the
United States and much harder to do in Germany."133 Consequently, legal
distinctions channeled American and German corporate capitalism onto two
distinct paths.
The comparative contrast in management structures and legal cultures
reflected broader and more fundamental distinctions in comparative
political economy. While Alfred Chandler, Jr. may have been correct
to identify German "cooperative managerial capitalism" as distinct
from the American style of "competitive managerial capitalism," the
differences run much deeper than contrasting organizational capabilities
and structures.134 Indeed, German scholars have long noted how a particular
type of "organized capitalism" characterized late nineteenth— and early
twentieth- century German political economy. Beginning with the pathbreaking work of Rudolph Hilferding, scholars have examined how the dense
German interdependence of cartels, trade associations, and state intervention
— through law and other means — not only led to greater cooperation between
business and government, but rather fused "state and economy into a new
system of domination and hegemony."135
The fusion of state and economy in Germany may explain why Prussian
authorities in the late nineteenth century imposed a corporate tax that
mitigated the "classical" system of double taxation. The Prussian Income
Tax Law of 1891 imposed a levy on the income of individuals as well
as "joint stock companies, shareholders’ limited liability companies, and
mining companies situated in Prussia."136 Unlike the nineteenth-century
U.S. statutes, which integrated the corporate and individual income taxes,
the 1891 Prussian law explicitly imposed a double tax on corporate profits
by taxing both retained and distributed profits, and by including dividends in
the personal income of shareholders.137 From the start, however, the Prussian
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law provided some relief from double taxation, though in a form that was
different from other fiscal systems. Whereas the British used an imputation
method to integrate fully the corporate and individual income tax during
this period, and while the United States in the early twentieth century used
dividend deductions and exclusions at the shareholder level to provide relief
to lower-income taxpayers, the Prussian law provided corporations with a
deduction for a small percentage of the company’s return on capital.138
By providing relief at the corporate level, Prussian authorities would seem
to have acknowledged that business corporations in Germany were part of
a special mix of public and private associations working within a complex
federal fiscal system. As one contemporary American tax expert explained,
the Prussian fiscal reforms of 1891 appeared to be rooted in a desire to make
taxation more equitable and an effort to reach a political compromise over the
proper taxation of Prussian and foreign shareholders. "The double taxation
of the Prussian stockholder may, perhaps, be defended on the principle of
the higher taxation of funded incomes," wrote the political economist Joseph
A. Hill, referring to income derived from capital as opposed to labor. Yet
Hill realized that because the Prussian tax applied only to corporations and
individuals situated in the state, the levy discriminated between Prussian
shareholders who would be liable for the double tax and foreign stockholders
who likely would not, unless their own state imposed a personal income
tax. The Prussian law, Hill concluded, "appears to be simply a compromise
between the desire to tax the foreign stockholder and the opposition which
might be made against taxing the Prussian stockholder twice on the full
amount of his dividends."139
Regardless of the motivations behind the Prussian corporate tax, in effect
Prussia adopted a mixed system that taxed corporate income twice, but
provided a degree of relief at the corporate level. Although this system was
altered over time, especially during World War I, it remained durable until
the mid-1920s when the centralization of political and fiscal powers led to
the adoption of the German income tax of 1925, which eliminated any kind
of relief, and thus created a fully classical system of double taxation of
corporate profits.140 By the end of the twentieth century most industrialized
nations seemed to be moving toward some limited form of relief from double
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taxation, but during the early formative years of the corporate income tax —
during the critical juncture at the turn of the twentieth century — Germany,
the U.K. and the U.S. seemed to occupy distinct places on the spectrum of
corporate income tax policy.

IV. CONCLUSION:
THE POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE
TAX EXCEPTIONALISM
Early twentieth-century American corporate tax policy reflected the peculiar
position that U.S. corporations occupied in the comparative history of law
and political economy. Long regarded as the creatures of state government
charters, U.S. corporations were susceptible to American state and local
property levies throughout the nineteenth and well into the twentieth century.
Although states and commonwealths frequently disagreed over how to treat
corporations, these increasingly large business organizations were never far
from the center of subnational tax policy debates. Economic experts, even
in this early period, acknowledged that the ultimate incidence of corporate
taxes was frequently uncertain. Still, the ambiguity of who paid the corporate
tax did not stop state and local lawmakers from using tax policy to try to
protect local economic interests and to express the social antipathy towards
monopoly power.
From a transnational comparative perspective, American corporate tax
policy seems to have been even more preoccupied with using tax policy
instrumentally to control corporate capital. Unlike their British counterparts,
U.S. lawmakers followed the lead of German theorists and policymakers in
viewing corporations not merely as the agents of individual economic actors,
but rather as separate legal entities with significant social responsibilities.
"Everywhere," wrote Edwin Seligman in his hugely popular Essays in
Taxation, corporations "form a problem of increasing importance and present
an admirable example of what is meant by taxation from a social rather
than from an individual point of view."141 This social point of view suggested
that American society, working through the state, not only had a legitimate
claim upon the profits and earning capacity of business corporations, but also
a right to exercise public control over private power. The social conception
of the corporation explained how corporate taxes could be both a form of
antimonopoly-inspired regulatory control and a rational and effective method

141 SELIGMAN, supra note 76, at 329.
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of collecting tax revenue. The social conception of the corporation also
captured the ambivalence that characterized the American reaction to the
arrival of big business; it explained why some contemporaries celebrated the
large-scale industrial corporation as the harbinger of material progress, while
others scorned it as a threatening source of concentrated economic power.
Scholars, to be sure, have long recognized the historical American
antipathy toward concentrated power, both public and private. Business
historians, in particular, have documented how and why the American
relationship between government and big business has been marked by a
comparatively unique tension over legitimate power and authority. That
historically-specific tension may help explain how the United States could
paradoxically embrace both a laissez-faire ideology and an aversion toward
monopoly power. The modest contribution of this Article has been to
extend these well-known insights from transnational business history to the
development of American corporate tax law. Doing so may shed some light
on the stubborn persistence of American corporate taxation, particularly
in the face of global changes and the relentless economic critiques of the
double taxation of corporate income.
Yet uncovering the comparative historical beginnings of U.S. corporate
taxation may also have broader implications. It may explain why American
policymakers have been reluctant to experiment with other forms of taxation,
such as the Value Added Tax — a levy that from a comparative perspective
is conspicuously absent in the United States. Because the adoption of the
1909 corporate tax occurred during a critical juncture in the path-dependent
development of American tax policy, this early and enduring commitment to
using tax policy to discipline corporate capital may explain why American
lawmakers have been unwilling, and perhaps unable, to turn to seemingly
regressive forms of taxation to fund the growth of the federal state. Simply
put, the blinders of punitive progressive corporate taxes may have foreclosed
the contingent possibilities of other forms of tax and transfer systems. The
limits as well as the achievements of the modern American fiscal state may
thus be traced back to the beginnings of the 1909 corporate tax.

